The Deckmyn decision is not about the definition of humor, it is only about the definition of parody in the copyright context: indeed, Article 5(3)(k) of the 2001/29 Directive on copyright in the information society provides that Member States might exempt from copyright a “use” of a protected element “for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche“. Although the text refers also to caricature and pastiche, this exception is known as the parody exception.

The facts of the case: at a New Year reception held in the city of Ghent in January 2011, Mr Deckmyn, a member of the Belgian Vlaams Belang political party, handed out small calendars. The cover page of those calendars reproduced the drawing depicted on this page, based on the cover of a Suske en Wiske (Bob et Bobette / Spike and Suzy) comic book entitled ‘The Compulsive Benefactor’.

The original cover of Suske en Wiske and its re-use by Mr Deckmyn

The original drawing pictured one character wearing a white tunic and throwing coins to people trying to pick them up. In the Deckmyn version, the character was replaced by the Mayor of the City of Ghent and the people trying to grab the coins were replaced by people wearing veils and by people of color. The underlying message was clear enough and in line with the anti-immigrant view supported by this political party.

In the copyright infringement action brought by the author of the comic strip before the Brussels court of first instance, the defendant (supported by a foundation linked to the party) argued that the drawing at issue was a political cartoon falling under the parody exception provided in the EU Directive as transposed in Article 22(1)(6) of the Belgian copyright law. To support their claim that there was no parody, the plaintiffs put forward the parody criteria defined by the Belgian case law: to qualify as parody, a reuse of a protected work must fulfil a critical purpose; itself show some originality; display humorous traits; seek to ridicule the original work; and not borrow a greater number of formal elements from the original work than is strictly necessary (see for ex. D. Voorhoof,  La liberté d’expression est-elle un argument légitime en faveur du non-respect du droit d’auteur ? La parodie en tant que métaphore, in A. Strowel and F. Tulkens (sous la dir.), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Larcier, 2006, p. 68). The presence of a discriminatory message was also an argument raised by the plaintiffs to oppose the parody argument. The Brussels Court of appeal referred several questions to the Court of justice of the EU.

The first one was whether the concept of “parody” was an autonomous concept of EU law. As already indicated, the CJEU responded positively to this question. This is in line with the recent CJEU decisions considering that several notions of copyright law (‘communication to the public” see here and here on ipdigit; “fair remuneration” for private copying, etc.) are to be defined at EU level so as to avoid an unharmonised interpretation of EU notions and the variations from one Member State to another (§ 16 of the decision). Harmonisation thus justifies that the CJEU be competent in areas pertaining to the freedom of expression. The recent CJEU case law is largely based on a balancing between several fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression (see for instance the March 27, 2014 UPC Telekabel decision of the CJEU, also discussed here on ipdigit). To realize that the CJEU, once focused on the economic freedoms of the EC Treaty, is now dealing extensively with other fundamental freedoms is a striking development which makes it more interesting than ever to compare its approach with the view of the European Court of Human Rights on similar issues. (I have recently written a piece about this in Rev. trim. dr. h., 100/2014, p. 889-911 entitled “Pondération entre liberté d’expression et droit d’auteur sur Internet: de la réserve des juges de Strasbourg à une concordance pratique par les juges de Luxembourg”).

The second question addressed to the CJEU was about the criteria for assessing when a parody (exempted from copyright claims) exists, and not just an adaptation (covered by copyright). The Court of justice underlined the role of the “usual meaning in everyday language” of the word “parody”. Relying on the opinion of the Advocate General, the Court listed two essential characterics of a parody: first it must evoke an existing work while being “noticeably different from it”; secondly, it must constitute an expression of humor or mockery (§20). The second condition requires from the national judges to decide whether the alleged parody contains (or not) “humor or mockery”. This aspect of the ruling might be critized (and be difficult to apply) as judges should not become the jury of what humor or mockery is (and are not best placed to do it). In any case, it shows that the definition of humor in the parody exception context remains within the ambit of the national judges and cultures, although it might be under the control of the CJEU at the end. The control by the CJEU should remain marginal as humor is contextually determined and varies according to nationality, age, gender, religion, ideology, social and cultural contexts, etc. (see D. Voorhoof and I. Høedt-Rasmussen, EU Court of Justice delivers preliminary ruling in Belgian Parody Case, 8 Sept. 2014, available here). In that sense, the possibility by the CJEU and, a fortiori, of the European Court of Human Rigths (ECHR), to control the definition of humor and parody will remain marginal. The scope for the review by the ECHR is in particular limited when a balance between several fundamental rights is at stake. The Deckmyn decision stresses that several fundamental rights do play a role as the objective of the 2001/29 Directive and in particular of its provision on parody is to harmonise copyright law in a way that takes into account “the fundamental principles of law and especially of property, including intellectual property, and freedom of expression and the public interest” (§25).

Here are a few additional comments and questions to consider in the discussion to start below:

First issue: the exception discussed covers not only parody, but also caricature and pastiche. Do you think it is worth to refer to those three types of “comments” (“genres” )? Are there arguments for having a law provision referring to parody solely or, on the contrary, to parody as well as caricature and pastiche?

Second issue: the Deckmyn decision makes it clear that the re-use of protected elements in the parody context is not only an exception to copyright, but that it is justified and protected by the freedom of expression (Art. 10 ECHR and Art. 11 EU Charter). The CJEU clearly states that “it is not disputed that parody is an appropriate way to express an opinion” (§ 25). Now the Deckmyn decision seems also to support the view that freedom of expression can justify a restrictive interpretation of what a parody is. Thus, more flexibility (than provided under the traditional Belgian interpretation: see on this the Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements of the Legal Framework for Copyright in the EU, Opinion of the European Copyright Society on Case C-201-13 Deckmyn final) is needed to interpret the parody exception, on one side, but  parody could be prohibited on the basis of freedom of expression, on the other side. Can you develop this idea? Does it mean that freedom of expression can thus favor, but also limit the speech for parody purpose? Is it a development to applaud or to fear?

Third issue: since Oct. 1, 2014, the UK Copyright Act provides for an exception for the purpose of parody. Do you think this exception as explained in official documents, for instance the Intellectual Property Office online guide (Exceptions to copyright: Guidance for creators and copyright owners, Oct. 2014), fits with the parody concept and criteria defined in Deckmyn?

Fourth issue: Do you think that the conditions for a parody to be exempted under trademark law (under the EU law) fit with the requirements  recently outlined by the CJEU in Deckmyn?

Thanks in advance for your feedback on those issues, in particular on the fourth issue that you should discuss more extensively.

Some marks are not distinctive per se, but gain a distinctive character due to their particular position on the object (so-called positional marks). Such positional marks are thus composed of two elements, of the mark itself and of its position on the product. Hence, in order to obtain trademark protection, it is crucial that the composition of the mark together with its specific position on the product enables consumers to distinguish those products from similar ones provided by another company (Do the consumers expect the mark to be displayed in the specific position? Is the mark sufficiently distinctive in the sense that it is not regarded as a purely decorative element?). For instance, in 2011 the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) decided to refuse the application of the Austrian shoe manufacturer Think Schuhwerk which asked for the registration of a positional mark to protect laced-up shoes with red-tip shoelaces. In its decision the OHIM stated that red-tip shoelaces are not regarded as sufficiently distinctive in order to help consumers to identify those shoes as the ones produced by Think Shuhwerk.

While the decision of the OHIM seems to be understandable in the previous case, the apparent lack of the distinctive character of a sign may be subject to discussion. This is illustrated in a recent decision by the General Court in Luxembourg. In January 2014, the Court refused a trademark application by the German toymaker Margarete Steiff.

The German toymaker Steiff has gained world-wide reputation for its high quality teddy bears. Those teddy bears are identified by a small metal button as well as by a yellow flag featuring the company’s logo. The button together with the label are attached to the toy’s left ear. In 2010, Steiff asked the OHIM for the registration of a positional mark thereby seeking protection “for the attachment of a metal button, shiny or mat, fixed to the middle of the ear of any soft toy with ears, and for the attachment of a fabric label in an elongated rectangular shape with such a button. The protection is [...] sought [...] only for the position of the attachment of such a button and the label by means of such a button in the middle of the ear of such soft toys.” 

That is, Steiff asked for the registration of two positional marks, a fabric label and/or a metal button attached to the ear of their soft toys. In 2010, the OHIM rejected the toymaker’s request.

The OHIM has rejected Steiff’s requests, holding that the marks applied for were devoid of distinctive character: they did not enable consumers to recognise the commercial origin of the products, that is to say that the product is a Steiff soft toy and not the soft toy of another manufacturer.

This decision was confirmed by the General Court in Luxembourg in January 2014.

Another example is given by Levi Strauss and its legal dispute with Colloseum Holding. Levi’s red tab jeans are easily distinguishable by a small red label which is attached to the right pocket of the jeans. In fact, Levi holds several European Trademarks, not only on the red label in a certain position on the jeans’ pockets, but also, among others, on a composite mark of the red label together with the writing Levi’s.

The Swiss company Colloseum started selling jeans with a similar red label, however, with its own brand name attached to it. When accused of breaching Levi’s trademark rights, Colloseum argued that the label featured their own brand name and thereby was sufficiently distinctive from Levi’s trademark. Further, the company brought forward that Levi, so far, never made use of the red label on its own. This in turn would violate the European genuine use requirements for brands and Levi should lose its trademark rights on the red tab on its own. However, the European Court of Justice responded that the red label constitutes an integral part of the Levi’s brand, even though it is not used separately.

This makes one wonder what distinguishes the Levi case from the Steiff case. Meaning why was Levi able to obtain a positional mark for the red label (even without the company’s logo attached to it), while Steiff was not? Should one not assume that consumers who are able to distinguish a Levi jeans from another jeans via a red tab are also able to identify a Steiff teddy bear via a yellow label attached to the toy’s ear?

Moreover, even if one was to agree that the trademark proposed by Steiff is not distinctive, could it not be argued that the sign acquired its distinctive character through its long and extensive use? In fact, Steiff was founded in the late 19th century and as early as 1904 started protecting its products from imitation by attaching a metal button to the ear.

Trademarks are supposed to enable companies to differentiate their products or services from the ones offered by their competitors. They thereby equally aim at helping consumers to identify products and to distinguish them from similar ones. Taken together, trademarks may encourage companies to invest in their brand and in the quality of their products or services. In the context of this article one may ask in what way granting a positional mark to Levi, but not granting such a mark to Steiff brings one further to reaching those goals.

Le film Jobs, sorti en 2013, déroule le parcours biographique du célèbre fondateur de la marque à la pomme, de ses années d’étudiant à la sortie en 2001 de l’iPod qui allait révolutionner l’accès à la musique et à d’autres contenus. (Ashton Kutcher est rentré dans la peau de Steve Jobs sous la direction de Joshua Stern.) On découvre un Jobs jeune passionné par les circuits intégrés mais aussi la calligraphie et la culture de carottes bio. La contre-culture des années 1960, ses hippies avec leurs rêves alternatifs nourris au LSD, les voyages en Inde, les couleurs psychédéliques, tout cela imprègne Jobs, qui opère une “fusion du Flower Power et des puces électroniques, de la quête de la révélation personnelle et de la haute technologie” (selon les mots de son biographe, W. Isaacson, Steve Jobs, Le Livre de Poche, 2011, p. 113).

En 1976, Steve Jobs et son ami Steve Wozniak, informaticien génial, décident de créer une société pour laquelle il fallait trouver un nom. Pendant un trajet en voiture, écrit W. Isaacson (p. 123),

“ils cherchèrent une idée. Un terme technique emblématique tel que Matrix? Ou un néologisme, tel que Executek, ou d’autres appellations d’une évidence ennuyeuse telle la Personal Computer Inc.? Ils devaient avoir une idée avant le lendemain, car Jobs voulait remplir les papiers. Finalement il proposa Apple Computer. “J’étais dans la phase “pommes” de mon régime expliqua-t-il. Je revenais de la plantation de pommiers. Je trouvais ce nom drôle et sympathique, et pas intimidant. Apple mangea finalement le mot “computer”. En plus, cela nous plaçait devant Atari dans l’annuaire!”. Il posa un ultimatum: si Wozniak n’avait pas une meilleure idée d’ici le lendemain après-midi, ce serait Apple. Et Apple ce fut“.

Au fil des années, Steve Jobs est parvenu à susciter une profonde allégeance à cette marque qui avait une image de simplicité, un effet un peu décalé et un zeste de contre-culture aux couleurs de l’arc-en-ciel, de retour à la nature. Aujourd’hui, c’est la marque la plus valorisée au monde (98,316 $m pour 2013) selon les évaluations d’Interbrand (ici).

Apple tire sa force d’une douce transgression. Déjà le logo de la pomme croquée évoque le péché mignon. Cette dose d’anticonformisme qui plaît, on la retrouve dans la célèbre publicité d’Apple “Think Different” (1997).

Le logo de 1976 à 1999

“Seuls ceux qui sont assez fous pour penser qu’ils peuvent changer le monde y parviennent”: lire cela dans une publicité flatte les attentes des consommateurs avides de refaire le monde et d’apparaître comme rebelles. Des consommateurs qui veulent que le produit marche, c’est la moindre des choses. Qu’il procure de l’émotion aussi. Avec Apple, l’ordinateur ou le téléphone n ‘est plus un objet technique, c’est un style, c’est de l’art. L’esthétique crée le prestige et la désirabilité. “Apple, fruit de la passion” titrait Le Monde (27 oct. 2012). Une passion savamment orchestrée par une entreprise. Ce conditionnement est l’envers du décor. “Apple, la tyrannie du cool” est le titre d’un film documentaire de D. Kourtchine et S. Bergère qui démonte certains ressorts du fanatisme détendu de la marque. Des chercheurs interrogés dans ce documentaire de 50 minutes expliquent “comment la contre-culture, qui voulut dans les années 1960 combattre le capitalisme en luttant contre l’homogénéisation des modes de vie, a au contraire merveilleusement servi le “système” en multipliant les formes de consommation” (présentation du film produit par Arte).

L’achat doit procurer au consommateur le sentiment qu’il est unique et différent des autres. Aujourd’hui la consommation n’est peut-être plus aussi ostentatoire qu’à l’époque où elle permettait d’affirmer un rang social. La marque ne signifie plus seulement l’appartenance à une classe: “L’individu dit ce qu’il est à travers une marque. C’est un emblème de sa personnalité, pas seulement de sa classe” commente le sociologue Gilles Lipovetsky (interrogé dans Le Monde, 27 oct. 2012). Les iPod, iPhone, iPad sont donc beaucoup plus que des appareils: ils reflètent une personne. On se retrouve soi-même au moment où on fait partie des fans suiveurs de la marque. “Par la grâce de cette foi nouvelle, écrivait R. Rérolle (Le Monde, 27 oct. 2012) de simples consommateurs sont devenus d’excellents propagandistes. Avec les meilleurs intentions, ils se sont enrôlés sous la bannière d’une marque”. Tout profit pour le Inc. derrière la marque.

L’effet religieux de la marque a été cultivé par Steve Jobs, notamment lors des présentations de produits, où le gourou présentait à ses adeptes des objets magiques. Quand, pour la première fois, vous voyez l’image s’agrandir sous l’effet de vos doigts, wow! L’objet qui réagit au “touch” devient un petit animal de compagnie — qui semble même avoir des besoins naturels: la prise magnétique cherche elle-même à se lover dans l’emplacement pour recharger la batterie.

La grande familiarité qui règne entre le produit et son propriétaire est renforcée par l’abondance de messages privés et données personnelles enfouis sous la surface de l’écran: une véritable boîte à secrets qui révèle tout de son utilisateur, ses contacts, ses messages, ses préférences musicales, les traits de ses proches, ses coups de coeur … et beaucoup d’autres données (géo-localisation, profil d’achat…) s’échappent de la boîte magique, sans que son propriétaire en soupçonne l’ampleur.

Mais revenons sur la biographie de W. Isaacson présentée comme un “livre sur le génie inventif humain. A une époque où les Etats-Unis – et, ajoutons, l’Europe — cherchent leur second souffle, où les sociétés à travers le monde tentent d’établir une nouvelle ère numérique, Steve Jobs se dresse comme l’icône de l’invention, de l’imagination et de l’audace” (p. 25). Plutôt qu’un inventeur, le film laisse découvrir un Steve Jobs en manager redoutable (et redouté car, lors de ses colères, il est capable d’utiliser perfidement les points faibles de ses adversaires).

Steve Jobs et sa société sont impliqués, comme d’autres grandes sociétés, dans de multiples litiges tournant autour de questions de propriété intellectuelle. Pouvez-vous relater une ou deux affaires ayant donné lieu à des procès? Merci de bien cerner en quelques mots la question juridique mais aussi de mettre en lumière la “morale de ces histoires” pour la conduite d’une société innovante. Vous avez le choix car la vie d’Apple est rythmée par des procès touchant aux droits intellectuels (voir ici)!

On April 7, 2011, the Federal Government of Australia released the plain packaging design (see the image on the side of this post) that cigarette manufacturers will be forced to adopt when a proposed legislation will come into force, possibly on January 1, 2012. All cigarette packets should then use olive green, a colour supposed to be dull, and reproduce not very attractive photos of smoking-related diseases. Significantly, cigarette manufacturers will be prevented to use their logos, trademarked colors of promotional texts. “The only thing to distinguish one brand from another will be the brand and product name in a standard colour, standard position and standard font size and style” according to the Nicola Roxon, the Australian Health Minister (see Finantial Times, 7 April 2011). Other governments, for example in the UK and Canada, are considering to adopt similar legislation on plain packaging. The tobacco industry is concerned as this new limitation on the way their products can be marketed might significantly reduce their sales.

Some claim that imposed plain packaging amounts to a taking or expropriation of intellectual property.

Do you think such a legislation would encroach on the protection granted by the intellectual property laws or by fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and property? In particular, are the international rules on IP, such as those included in the Paris Convention and the TRIPs Agreement, violated by such a law?

This is the question I would like you to think about.

There are a lot of sources available on line. The tobacco industry of course has its view on the issue (see for example here). On the contrary, some academics think the tobacco industry’s case is weak (here).